A Response to Mr. Keefner

Kurtiss Keefner's question of: "Ought a moral agent act morally towards a moral patient?" seems to be a hot topic in all the readings we have done so far. Reading further then last week's blogging session (Is that cheating?) I came upon R.G. Frey who discusses the interests (or lack there of) of animals. Since Regan's qualification for moral patients part b requires interests it made me wonder (using his logic) if Regan is correct in making a "part b" moral agent. Mr. Frey's analogy of the tractor that performs better if it is well oiled, yet has no verbal or intelligent way to communicate that it has an interest in being well oiled made me wonder if language is a barrier between not only nonhuman animals and humans, but if it's a barrier between having "interests" (or, rather, "wants and desires" as he puts it) and thus, be the subjects of rights as Leonard Nelson was referred to saying.

Donovan would disagree entirely with Frey's argument, saying that we must listen to what the animal is telling us and that there should be no such thing as a language barrier... I seem to side with Mr. Frey in this one, not because I dislike animals, but because, in our world where communication is so essential, it is completely odd to "listen" to something which cannot communicate on the same level as us. A dog can bark, a dog can whine, but are we able to understand anything? Other then the fact that the animal is distressed in some degree. My dog barks incessantly at the slightest sound. the bark sounds angry, but for all I know, my dog could be saying, "hello" or "You are trespassing " or "give me food!" I understand it as, "oh I heard something! Look everything, I heard something! WHEEE!!!" (as she spins around quickly while barking louder and louder with every rotation.)

That being said, if we go back to the original question, should we "moral agents" act morally towards a moral patient, I would say first that, based on Frey's analysis and definitions partnered by Nelson's distinction between needs, and wants... I would say there can be no "a" or "b" moral patient, that everything must be grouped together as one since they are "all the same" and, since they are all at the same level, they have no rights since they have no desire for rights, only an "interest" in their basic needs for survival. Therefore, since they have "no rights" we should act on the side of caution. I liked that discussion in class. "if you are unsure, act on the side of caution" if we don't need to kill something, we shouldn't need to kill it. Try telling that to a wolf that just brutally maimed a squirrel and, if Donovan is correct, the wolf will tell us, "I was hungry and needed to eat, therefore I killed it." Ask a human who just ate a ham sandwich and he will tell you, "I haven't eaten all day and was really hungry!"

I found this picture online and thought it was a little bit relevant...

or I am just insane and enjoy pictures.

To conclude this long post, "I believe a moral agent ought to act 'morally' towards a moral patient, within the bounds of it's own needs."