A Response to Mr. Ishmael

Further commenting on Raj's post about habituation and auto pioleting, I decided to throw another example into the mix, relating to tigers because they are cute. I think this example is more biological then making a habit of things, but it's cool! In Tailand, a tiger that was raised by a pig raises pigs. This is quite interesting, as the video describes since, yes they are "mortal enemies"  but I think it harkens back to what we discussed on Monday in class about how you can develop habits by trying things over and over. In this case, it seems the sow accepted the tiger cub's mewing and body language, offering them food, the cubs suckled and realized that this thing gives food if I'm nice and gentile to it. Since they had no "training" from a parent, they did not learn to hunt, they learned to feed off of the sow's milk (the zoo probably fed them individually some meat as they grew older) I find these stories fascinating. 

I also think that this is how we developed our relationship with dogs or with any pets. I mean, I have a German shepherd who barks and scares little kids who have never met her, but if they try enough, they get used to her... She looks like a coyote and if I see a coyote I get intimidated and reach for my knife or any weapon nearby, but I don't do this to my dog. I believe it is due to me placing extrinsic value on my dog above that of some "wild animal" even if they look similar and are "the same." Now, relating this back to ethics and rights, I feel that any animal can be conscious of it's environment, much like any human can have a memory of where to walk and where not to walk through experiance. To get into neurobiology a bit, it is (as of now, only a theory) the spines on our dendrites within not only the telencephelon (forebrain or "cortex"... the big part of our brain) but the whole body that gives "us" (all animals) our muscle memory and in a few animals (yes.... particularly mammals... especially those above 1 year of age...)  the telencephelon is more developed (or actually develops) giving the animal a sense of "mental memory" and I guess you could say "consciousness." so it's not ethics we are discussing, it's biochemistry!!

A Response to Mr. Keefner

Kurtiss Keefner's question of: "Ought a moral agent act morally towards a moral patient?" seems to be a hot topic in all the readings we have done so far. Reading further then last week's blogging session (Is that cheating?) I came upon R.G. Frey who discusses the interests (or lack there of) of animals. Since Regan's qualification for moral patients part b requires interests it made me wonder (using his logic) if Regan is correct in making a "part b" moral agent. Mr. Frey's analogy of the tractor that performs better if it is well oiled, yet has no verbal or intelligent way to communicate that it has an interest in being well oiled made me wonder if language is a barrier between not only nonhuman animals and humans, but if it's a barrier between having "interests" (or, rather, "wants and desires" as he puts it) and thus, be the subjects of rights as Leonard Nelson was referred to saying.

Donovan would disagree entirely with Frey's argument, saying that we must listen to what the animal is telling us and that there should be no such thing as a language barrier... I seem to side with Mr. Frey in this one, not because I dislike animals, but because, in our world where communication is so essential, it is completely odd to "listen" to something which cannot communicate on the same level as us. A dog can bark, a dog can whine, but are we able to understand anything? Other then the fact that the animal is distressed in some degree. My dog barks incessantly at the slightest sound. the bark sounds angry, but for all I know, my dog could be saying, "hello" or "You are trespassing " or "give me food!" I understand it as, "oh I heard something! Look everything, I heard something! WHEEE!!!" (as she spins around quickly while barking louder and louder with every rotation.)

That being said, if we go back to the original question, should we "moral agents" act morally towards a moral patient, I would say first that, based on Frey's analysis and definitions partnered by Nelson's distinction between needs, and wants... I would say there can be no "a" or "b" moral patient, that everything must be grouped together as one since they are "all the same" and, since they are all at the same level, they have no rights since they have no desire for rights, only an "interest" in their basic needs for survival. Therefore, since they have "no rights" we should act on the side of caution. I liked that discussion in class. "if you are unsure, act on the side of caution" if we don't need to kill something, we shouldn't need to kill it. Try telling that to a wolf that just brutally maimed a squirrel and, if Donovan is correct, the wolf will tell us, "I was hungry and needed to eat, therefore I killed it." Ask a human who just ate a ham sandwich and he will tell you, "I haven't eaten all day and was really hungry!"

I found this picture online and thought it was a little bit relevant...

or I am just insane and enjoy pictures.

To conclude this long post, "I believe a moral agent ought to act 'morally' towards a moral patient, within the bounds of it's own needs."